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NATURE OF Tlffi CASE 
This action was filed by Appellant David E. Sheley (Sheley) 
against Respondent Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) 
on a claim of fraud perpetuated by Merrill Lynch employee Robert G. Oyler (Oyler) 
against Sheley. Merrill Lynch filed a Third Party Compaint against Oyler on the 
basis that if Merrill Lynch was liable to Sheley, Oyler was in turn liable therefor 
to Merrill Lynch. The fraud claim arose out of the purchase by Sheley of two 
$1,000.00 bonds in a company known as Concepts International. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial to the court, the Honorable Calvin Gould, sitting without 
a ju ry , resolved the issues against Sheley and in favor of Merrill Lynch. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Sheley asks reversal of Judge Gould1 s decision, and judgment as 
a matter of law for either recission or a money judgment against Merrill Lynch for 
$2,000.00. Merrill Lynch seeks affirmance of the trial court decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS , n 
r
 '•")• ». The Trial Court resolved disputed facts against Sheley, accordingly 
such facts should be presented to this Court in the light most favorable to Merrill 
Lynch. 
The bare bones of the transaction are not in dispute. Sheley went to 
Merrill Lynch to see Oyler, an employee of Merrill Lynch, upon recommendation of 
a friend (R-91). If Oyler had worked at a firm other than Merrill Lynch, Sheley 
would have gone to the other firm instead of Merrill Lynch (R-119). In June of 
1973, Sheley purchased some $5,000.00 worth of two stocks, Pacific Power and Light 
and Bank America Real Estate (R-93,94) . Pacific was then on the Merrill Lynch 
recommended list, Bank America was not (R-150). Sheley paid for the stocks by 
two personal checks he wrote payable to Merrill Lynch (R-99,114). 
In September of 1973, after a short visit with Oyler, Sheley sold the 
Pacific stock for $2,400.00 earning a profit of some $400.00 (R-112). At this time 
he also purchased two $1,000.00 bonds from a company called Concepts International 
(Concepts) (R-98). Sheley paid for these bonds with a check (Ex A) he made 
payable not to Merrill Lynch, but to Concepts. The check was drawn by Sheley 
on a joint account with his wife, Noreen, and the proceeds of the Pacific sale 
(joint funds with Noreen) were used to cover the check (R-116). 
Sheley has never made demand for delivery of the bonds from Concepts, 
and in fact has refused to accept them despite attempted delivery (R-143) . Concepts 
is a Utah corporation in good standing both at time of sale and time of t r ial . It 
operates a business , has assets , employees, and has paid interest on its bonds. 
(R-146, 147). 
Merrill Lynch had obtained from Oyler, as part of its management policy, 
an affidavit disclaiming any outside interests (R-137). The first information 
Merrill Lynch received of OylerTs involvement with Concepts was after OylerTs 
termination of employment (R-125). Additional facts, as they apply to specific 
issues , will be set out in the argument on those issues, 
P O I N T O N E 
OYLER WAS NOT THE AGENT OF MERRILL LYNCH IN THE 
SALE TO SHELEY OF CONCEPTS BONDS 
It is undisputed, and conceded by Sheley, that Oyler had no authority 
from Merrill Lynch to sell Sheley the Concepts bonds. Similiarly, Merrill Lynch 
had no authority from Concepts International to sell such bonds. The transaction 
was never entered on Merrill Lynch books, and Merrill Lynch received no consider-
ation of any nature from the sale. Merrill Lynch was unaware of OylerTs activity 
until long after the transaction was completed. (R-125). The trial court found 
Sheley was not the agent of Merrill Lynch in fact or in law (R-66) with regard to 
this purchase • 
There are several Utah cases dealing with the liability of the employer 
for torts of the employee. Barney v Jewel Tea, 104 U. 292, 139P2d878, (1943) 
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was a suit arising out of a battery committed by an agent employed to sell 
merchandise and collect accounts. In holding the employer not liable, this 
Court said: , > ,/: v r 
"We believe the better rule to be that a principal is not liable 
for the willful tort of an agent which is comitted during the 
: course of his employment unless it is committed in the further-
ance of his employer's interests or unless the employment 
is such that the use of force could be contemplated in its 
accomplishment." 
A similiar result obtained in Sweatman v Linton, 1925, 66 U. 208, 241 P. 309: 
"The general rule stating under what circumstances a principal, 
such as the packing company in this case, is answerable for the 
acts of its agents, is clearly stated in the second headnote to 
Pressley v Mobile & G. R. Co. (C. C.) 15 F . 199, as follows: 
"If an agent, while acting within the range of his employment, 
does an act injurious to another, either through negligence, 
wantonness, or intention, then for such abuse of the authority 
conferred upon him or implied in his appointment the master or 
employer is responsible in damages to the person thus injured; 
but if the agent go beyond the range of his employment or duties, 
iii and of his own will does an unlawful act injurious to another, the 
agent is liable, but the master or employer is not." 
The Sweatman case was relied upon in the 10th Circuit case of Oman v . United 
States, 1949, 179 F2d 738: i 
"A principal is liable civilly for the tortious acts of his agent which 
are done within the course and scope of the agentTs employment or 
agency, even though the principal did not authorize, ratify, part ic-
ipate in , or know of such misconduct. But, a principal i^not liable 
to third persons for torts committed by his agent acting outside the 
scope of hij3 employment. If the agent goes outside his employment 
and acts not in furtherance of the principal 's business , but to effect 
some purpose of his own, the principal is not l iable." (Emphasis added) . 
R & B Supply Co. v Bringhurst , 1972, 28U2nd, 442, 503 P2nd 1216, 
reviewed the apparent authority of an agent receiving goods to sign an invoice 
binding the principal to the payment of collection and attorneys fees. This court 
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held the agent had no such implied or apparent authority. > 
•:. , n Sheley relies in chief upon three cases in his brief on the agency 
question. The first, Clothier v Beane, Okla. 1940, 105 P2d 752 is of no assist-
ance. In that case the customers man clearly had actual authority to answer the 
buyers inquiries on Chrysler stock. In doing so, he made an er ror , and of 
course the principal was responsible to the customer for such error made in the 
course of employment. 
The second, Andrews v Seidner, Cal. App. 1942, 121 P2d 863 involved 
an assault by the employee of a beer hall. The result was controlled by a specific 
California statute, and is contrary to the Utah law as set out in Jewel Tea, supra. 
The third case, Lewis v Walston & Co. Inc . , 5th C C A . 1973, 487 
F 2d 617 is distinguishable in two critical areas:
 f •;• .^  
- In Walston, the customers were long time clients of the brokerage 
firm itself. In contrast, Sheley had no dealings with Merrill Lynch other than the 
one previous transaction with Oyler. In fact, but for Oyler, Sheley would not have 
gone to Merrill Lynch at all. c 
- In Walston, the manager of the brokerage was well aware, prior 
to the sales, of the activities of the agent in soliciting the sales. The manager had 
even talked with the plaintiffs (prior to the sale) about the proposed transactions, 
but took no action to prevent it and did not in any way warn the customer it was 
not an authorized sale. To the contrary, the evidence in Walston was to the effect 
that the brokerage often dealt with established customers on issues not regularly 
handled by the brokerage. No such evidence was here offered. 
Two recent cases support the position of Merrill Lynch. Glendale 
Realty v Johnson, Wash. App. 1972, 495 P2d 1375 involved a fraud action for 
misrepresentation against a real estate company and its sales agent. The agent 
was found liable for the fraud, the company was not because the agent had no authority 
to so act. » ' . . 
Schuette v Winternitz, Colo. App. 1972, 498 P2d 1183 holds that the 
principal is not bound by the misrepresentation of his agent, made without the 
pr inc ipa l s knowledge, consent or authority. If the principal received some 
benefit a consideration from the transaction induced by the agents fraud, recission 
could be had against the principal. Since the principal did receive nothing, the 
only available remedy was against the agent in damages. 
• In our case, Merrill Lynch received nothing. As opposed to furthering 
the p r inc ipa l s business , it is difficult to imagine what Oyler could have done that 
would be more damaging. The key here may very well be Exhibit "A". Sheley 
had, on previous transactions, issued two checks payable to Merrill Lynch. He 
also received confirmations of those sales directly from Merrill Lynch. Now if 
Exhibit TTATT was made payable to Merrill Lynch or to cash or bearer , Sheley may 
have some claim because he could argue Oyler had apparent authority to receive 
payment for his principal. It is difficult to see any argument that Oyler had 
apparent authority from Merrill Lynch to accept monies payable to Concepts. 
The very fact that Oyler requested the check be payable to Concepts, together 
with SheleyTs knowledge of the previous payments being made to Merrill Lynch, 
must destroy (if it ever existed) any apparent or implied authority theory that 
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would enable Sheley to recover against Merrill Lynch. By making the check 
payable to Concepts, Sheley acknowledged he was not dealing with Merrill Lynch, 
and set the stage for what followed. In view of all the circumstances, we submit 
that in fact and law Oyler was not Merrill LynchTs agent in this transaction. 
P O I N T T W O 
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION -
IN FRAUD 
This suit, although it involves the sale of a security, is not a securities 
action. It is not founded upon statutory or administrative disclosure requirements, 
but is a garden variety common law action in fraud (R-l) . Fraud allegations must 
be spelled out with particularity, 9(b) ,U. R.C .P . The burden is with Sheley to 
prove all of the essential elements (9) of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, 
Pace v Parr ish, 1952, 122 U. 141, 247 P2d 273. For evidence to be clear and 
convincing, it must be such there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the 
correctness of the conclusion, Greener v Greener, 1949, 116 U. 571, 212 P2d 194. 
The Trial Court (R-83) found Sheley wanting. 
The nine (9) elements are: . , * > 
1) a representation; 
2) of a present existing material fact; ifrnuo B C ^ 
^ :--: 3) falsity; Jq\ ••riQ>" ; i : ^1=">VH. :JU^ i i n ' ^vJ - •••'• \ 
4) made with knowledge of falsity; 
5) to induce action; 
6) Plaintiff acting reasonably, and in ignorance of the falsity; 
7) Actual reliance; 
8) Action taken in reliance; 
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9) damage result ing. 
It is necessary to look at the transcript to see what evidence there 
is to support the charge of fraud. The Concepts bonds were discussed by Sheley 
and Oyler on only one occasion, September 26, at that meeting Sheley decided 
to sell the Pacific stocks, and buy the Concepts bonds (R-110). Sheley denies 
any misrepresentation or falsity induced him to sell Pacific ( R - l l l , 112): 
Q "Let me ask you th is , to your knowledge did he tell you anything 
f< *; false about Pacific Power & Light that induced you to sell that stock? 
A Nothing false, it just wasn't doing as good as he thought it would b e . " 
Sheley was asked in direct (R-97, 108) and cross examination 
(R-109, 110) to detail the representations he relied upon in making his 
purchase. Sheley testified Oyler told him Concepts was a California - Utah business; 
doing well; selling home cleaning and commercial rug cleaning equipment; would 
be a good investment; a Mr. Glasmann had invested in the company; it had a big 
display at the Utah State Fair (R- 97, 108, 109). Sheley further said (R-97): 
Q "Now at that time was there any discussion as to whether this 
company was registered with Merrill Lynch or registered with 
the New York Stock Exchange, or American Stock Exchange? 
A No, s i r . " „.u -. >.„..\.w. ,a :.. 
On cross examination, Sheley admitted he had no information as to 
whether in fact Mr. Glasmann had invested in Concepts; whether it had a display 
at the fair or not; whether it had been doing business in California and Utah; that 
he had no discussion with Oyler as to whether Concepts was an approved Merrill 
Lynch security, or was on any recognized market exchange, or even whether it 
had any market at all. Sheley then testified (R-110): 
- 8 - • - : . . - . . • - * . . / 
Q MNow you told us in response to counsel1 s questions and my 
questions everything you can recall that he told you on the 
]:* T -• 26th of September regarding these bonds? 
A Yes, to the best of my — that I can remember, those things that 
I have told you." 
Independent of Sheley, no evidence of the falsity of any of these 
claimed misrepresentations was offered. The two statements regarding Tdoing 
wellT and Tgood investment can be no more than opinion, and not actionable. 
Lewis v White, 1954, 2 U. 2d 101, 269 P2d 865. Beyond this however, there 
wras no evidence that either statement was false when made. 
Appellants Brief seems to recognize this deficit in proof. As nearly 
as we can make out, the representations now claimed actionable are (App. Brief 
page 12): 
1. The investment in Concepts was in SheleyTs best interest. In fact 
Sheley never attributed such a statement to Oyler. Even if it were 
proved to have been said, it is again opinion, not fact. 
2. The sale was being made through Merrill Lynch. Sheley acknowledged 
(R-116) he knew he was buying the bonds from Concepts. 
3. A^  representation of value was untrue . No representation of value 
was ever made to Sheley. 
4. The payment directly to Concepts was the usual and ordinary way 
to handle a Merrill Lynch transaction. Sheley never testified Oyler said 
th is , merely that he (Sheley) assumed it. (R-115). Yet Sheley, in 
two separate transactions three months earlier, knew they had been 
handled just the opposite, by payment directly to Merrill Lynch. 
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The Trial Court did not find Sheley to have relied to his detriment 
on any false representations. Even though inexperienced, a person may not 
accept unquestioningly any representations made to him. It is the duty of a 
purchaser to make such investigations and inquiries as reasonable care would 
dictate, Lewis v White, supra. Sheley knew that securities offering 12 per cent 
re turn , such as Concepts, were higher risk investments than lower return 
securities (R-113). He knew this was a new, young company with no earnings 
track record, and carried with it r i sks , (R-140, 150) . He knew he was not dealing 
with Merrill Lynch when he made the check payable to Concepts (R-116). Despite all of 
th is , after a thirty minute visit he made this purchase with no further inquir ies . 
Certainly this does not show, clearly and convincingly, that Sheley acted reasonably 
in the matter. He should not now be heard to complain against Merrill Lynch, which 
was entirely innocent of any wrong doing or negligence. 
P O I N T T H R E E 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED SHELEY FAILED 
TO PROVE DAMAGE 
The complaint (R-l) asked alternatively for recission or damages. 
Since Merrill Lynch received nothing in the transaction, and was not a party to 
it , recission was unavailable. SheleyTs only remedy is suit for damage, and 
again, as damage is one of the essential elements for the fraud action, he must 
prove this damage by clear and convincing evidence. 
Kinnear v Prows, 1932, 81 U. 135, 16 P2d 1094 is a case very much 
in point. Here a fraud action for damage was brought, claiming certain false 
representations caused plaintiffs to accept stocks in two companies. Because 
plaintiffs did not show what the value of the stock he received actually was 
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at the time of transfer, a nonsuit granted by the Trial court was affirmed by this 
court:
 tl , . , . , . . . . . . - l V ) i f 
"The burden was on plaintiffs to show what, if any, value the 
stock had, and, if they depended upon evidence of the actual 
value of the property, they should have produced some evidence 
of the reasonable market value or the actual value of the property 
in its then condit ion. . ." 
again, at page 139, 
"There is no evidence whatever of the real or market value of this 
stock at the time it was transferred to plaintiffs, or of the financial 
condition of the company, and hence no evidence of injury or 
damage by reason of such false representations. We cannot presume 
the value to be less than represented because it might well be that 
earnings of the corporation, if any, remained in the treasury or 
were used to extend and develop the property and business of the 
corporation, in which event the value of the stock might be equal 
to or greater than as represented." 
The identical problem exists in our case. Sheley offered no evidence 
of value of the Concepts bonds. The Trial Court (R-83) found that damage was 
not proved. No one offered an opinion of value of the bonds. While there was 
no market for the bonds as such, they had value according to the one witness asked 
that question, Oyler (R-146). No witness testified the bonds did not have value, or 
were worth less than $1,000.00 each. No balance sheets or profit and loss state-
ments were put into evidence. All the Trial Court knew about Concepts came 
from Oyler, who testified a) Concepts is a Utah corporation in good standing (R-146); 
b) Oyler was an employee of Concepts at the time of trial (R-128); c) In 1973, 
Concepts was doing business in California, and had a sales distributor there (R-130); 
d) Concepts markets a line of janitorial supplies and equipment, steam cleaners 
for carpets (R-131); e) Oyler had no way of determining the net worth of 
Concepts, other than through consultation with its accountant, who was not called 
- 1 1 -
as a witness (R-132); f) The assets of the company were used to purchase 
equipment, inventory, etc. (R-134); g) Concepts has a business office at ' 
3207 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah (R-145); h) Concepts has paid interest 
on bonds since 1973 (R-148). 
Based on the above, the Trial court had no alternative but to find 
that Sheley had not met his burden of proof on damage. For the court to say the 
bonds, instead of being worth $2,000.00, were actually worth only $1,000.00, or 
$500.00, or any other figure would be nothing but speculation. The one fact 
that stands out from the evidence is the bonds do have value. This Court, following 
Kinnear v Prows, supra, may not presume that value less than Sheley paid for 
them. 
We submit that Sheley has here sued the wrong par ty . Concepts 
received his $2,000.00, not Merrill Lynch. If he wants to rescind the transaction, 
he should seek to do so against Concepts, a going business . This same issue 
was faced by this court in Milliner v Fox, 1974, Utah, 529 P2d 806. That was a 
case involving securit ies, where the purchaser claimed accountants and attorneys 
had improperly caused him to purchase stock in Commercial Liquidation Inc. It 
is similiar to our case because there , as here , the defendant did not sell the 
security to the plaintiff, but is claimed to have been responsible for the purchase 
by the plaintiff: '* 
'- "Defendants further claim that the plaintiffs have failed to 
join an indispensable par ty . There is merit in that contention 
inasmuch as the plaintiffs purchased the stock from Commercial 
Liquidators, Inc . , as claimed by the allegations of the complaint. 
Plaintiffs should seek to recover back from the seller rather than 
from third parties unless the corporation has been dissolved or 
is under some disability. The plaintiffs have failed to allege 
any fact which would tend to show that the corporation is not 
_ 1 9 _ 
an indispensable par ty. The plaintiffs make general allegations 
of fraud, but they failed to comply with Rule 9(b) , U .R .C .P . " 
CONCLUSION 
We submit the Trial Court rulings were based on sound interpreta-
tions of the evidence and should not be disturbed. The judgment of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed in all respects . 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
Olmstead, Stine & Campbell 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Respondent 
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